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Abstract: Sexual violence against male victims during armed conflict still remains
largely under-researched. The small amount of research that does exist attributes the
occurrence of such violence to the perpetrator’s desire to assert their own masculine
power. However, claiming that sexual violence against males is perpetrated only to
assert personal masculinity fails to explain the attempt of individual perpetrators to
use sexual violence to feminize enemy communities during armed conflict. Instead,
this essay argues that it is the state that embodies normative masculinity. The State as
an ideational entity demands the defense and expansion of its normative masculinity
during armed conflict. This embodiment of ideal masculinity is envisioned and also
aspired to by the individuals. Consequently, individuals within that state become
subordinate agents tasked with implementing the state’s demand through violent
means like sexual violence against other males. Failing to recognize that the
occurrence of sexual violence lies in the logic of state’s masculinity leads to
insufficient understanding of both the occurrence of sexual violence against males, as
well as the reluctance of both national and international community to properly
address this atrocity.
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Introduction:
Before World War II, the world considered rape and sexual violence as
“inevitable by-products of war or ascribed to renegade soldiers”, where no “single
case of rape was punished” even at the Nuremberg trials (Oosterhoff et al. 2004). The
widespread use of sexual violence as a weapon of war was publicly acknowledged
after the war in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was mandated to try the perpetrators of
heinous crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of the laws of war and
serious breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions) committed during the conflict
(Oosterhoff et al. 2004). The abundant testimony by female rape survivors of the
former Yugoslavia conflict resulted in the legal recognition of sexual violence as a
crime.
While sexual violence against women in conflict rose to prominence during
trials at ICTY, cases of sexual violence against males were largely silenced or swept
aside “under the rubric of torture and not sexual violence” (Sivakumaran 2007).
However, even though “studies suggest that sexual torture of men is not uncommon”
back then, thorough reports were “almost non-existent” (Oosterhoff et al. 2004). This
bleak recognition stands in drastic contrast with the reality that “[s]exual violence
against men has been documented as taking place in many armed conflicts”
(Sivakumaran 2007). To be sure, there is no doubt that women and girls constitute
“the large majority of the victims of gender-based violence” (Linos 2009). But it is
also undeniable that men have been the victim of sexual violence since ancient times
(Linos 2009). In fact, built upon a “complex web of cultural preconceptions,” sexual
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violence against males has been used since the ancient times to “break down their
morale and enforce complete subjugation upon the defeated enemy” (Misra 2015). In
ancient war, male rape was considered “an absolute right of the victorious soldiers to
declare the totality of the enemy’s defeat and to express their total and absolute power
and control” (Misra 2015). Similar incidents of sexual violence against males also
appear in wars such as in “Ancient Persia, and the Crusades, as well as by the Ancient
Greek, Chinese, Amalekite, Egyptian and Norse armies” (Sivakumaran 2007).
Despite public ignorance, this tradition has apparently lingered on. For
example, Agger demonstrates how sexual violence has been used as a tool of political
repression against male political dissents in El Salvador (Agger 1989). Similarly,
Cienfuegos and Monelli note the adoption of sexual violence against male victims as
a repressive tool in Chile (Cienfuegos and Monelli 1983). In Gonadal and Sexual
Functions in Tortured Greek Men, Lindholm et al. illustrate the inflicting of sexual
violence against male victims in Greece conflict (Lindholm et al.1980). Testimonies
in I have been in torture photos too: The Abu Ghraib images are all too familiar to
Irish republicans show sexual violence against male Irish victims, too (Adams 2004).
In addition, such occurrences of sexual violence against male victims are also
documented in Guatemala (Perlin 2000). The reports of conflicts in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (see Katy Glassborow, 2008; Human Rights Watch 2015) have
shown sexual violence towards male victims. The leaked footage of sexual abuse
upon male detainees in Abu Ghraib and other places in Iraq by U.S. armies (Misra
2015) also revealed the very existence of sexual violence in the barracks. In the
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research about male victims of former Yugoslavia conflict in Croatia, Oosterhoff et al.
found that “sexual torture of men was a regular, unexceptional component of violence
in wartime Croatia, not a rare occurrence” (Oosterhoff et al. 2004).
The post-conflict reports from medical and other human rights organizations
also evidence the wide spread, though underreported, use of sexual violence against
males in various armed conflicts. In an Amnesty International report, a Congolese
activist explicitly claims that “the rape of men is much more frequent than you might
think” (Amnesty International). Medicines Sans Frontieres also documents treating
several men in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as victims of
sexual violence (Medicine Sans Frontiere).
While acknowledging the different notion and the corresponding role of state
in ancient times compared to that of modern ear, the documentations of modern
conflicts mentioned above nonetheless indicate the prevalence of sexual violence
against males in armed conflict. However, as mentioned above, this large though
scattered body of evidence of sexual violence against males in armed conflict, has not
resulted in adequate recognition from the international world. Current scholar work
does not provide sufficient explanation that accounts for the occurrence of such
heinous crime. Based on the extremely scattered records and evidence, most of the
literature focuses on the dominant agency of individual perpetrators in explicating this
event. For example, while affirming that sexual violence against males involves the
functionality of humiliation, Lindner argues such functionality “can serve the
individual desire of the perpetrator to challenge or cover their own vulnerabilities”
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(Lindner 2004).
In order to understand why such prevalence of sexual violence against males
in armed conflict does not get same attention as that against female victims, it is
essential to understand the role of modern state. In developing this theory this essay
intends to show that state is a masculinized. The State is conceived as an ideational
entity that is materialized through the establishment of its administrative, judiciary,
and enforcement institutions. This institutionalized ideational entity embodies the
hegemonic normative masculinity determined by the fluid and relational process of
masculinization. Throughout the process of masculinization, such normative
masculinity emphasizes the capability of enforcement as a means of dominance and
control on both physical and non-physical means. Built on a relational process, this
state masculinity demands defense and maintenance of its masculine authority
through strategies and tactics that masculinize itself and correspondingly feminize the
other groups. Therefore, while recognizing that the process of masculinization drives
the occurrence of sexual violence against males in armed conflict, it is the
masculinization of the state, rather than that of individuals, that underwrites and
facilitates the occurrence of sexual violence against males in armed conflict. In armed
conflict, sexual violence against both females and males becomes instrumental for
both state and its agents in defending and reproducing this normative masculinity,
hence the state itself.
While state has been using sexual violence against males in armed conflict to
assert its own masculinity –masculinizing itself – after the 1990s many states agreed
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to recognize and prosecute sexual violence in armed conflict through international
legal institutions. Paradoxical as such criminalization of sexual violence may seem, it
is noticeable that up till this day only sexual violence against female victims has been
recognized in international legal institutions, while violent cases against male victims
– if they are ever reported – have been lumped together and prosecuted under the
general category of torture. Hence the securitization of sexual violence against males
is selective. This selective securitization of sexual violence in armed conflict against
only female victims actually reflects how the state continues to use sexual violence as
an instrument in strengthening its own masculinity. Hirschauer argues that
securitization takes place once an issue or concern is transformed from a nonpolitical
or a political status into an existential threat. The process of securitization is a
“political choice” to recognize an issue as an “existential threat” (Hirschauer 2014).
This process suggests an identifying mechanisms to analyze how, if and when
“something” is worthy or deserving of being regarded as a security issue and why – or
why not. By securitizing an issue, states as securitization actors – for instance,
military leaders – begin to abandon prior values and norms and assumed new ones.
Accordingly, criminalization of sexual violence is a process of securitization with
which states elevate the sexual violence to an existential threat. The new values and
norms born out of this securitization process then become new discursive framework
that serves to enhance the securitization state’s masculinity. States choose to securitize
and prosecute sexual violence against female victims in armed conflict to highlight
their own self-discipline through pathologizing and demonizing their enemy groups,
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while keeping silent on issue of securitizing sexual violence against male victims in
armed conflict because of the ultimately detrimental effect on the masculine image of
those states.
The summary of the theory thus goes like this: men aspire to an ideal of
masculinity. Through a relational process of masculinization, this ideal masculinity
emphasizes virility, physical dominance against others, and protective capability upon
itself and those who belong to its own group. Men build the state to better serve those
interests to facilitate the process of masculinization in order to reach this ideal
maasculinity. Throughout the state-building process men project their ideal masculine
norms onto the state. As a consequence of this norming and masculinizing process,
state becomes a gendered ideational entity that is known to embody their normative
masculinity. This ideal, normative masculinity is superior and thus aspired to by men.
Correspondingly, men submit their personal masculinity and its interests to that of the
state. The state’s ideal thus encompassing masculinity becomes fundamental to those
men’s personal masculinity. In this way, the state becomes the principle that dictates
the behavioral and strategic preferences of the individual men – the agents – when
they serve the state.
The maintenance and defense of the state requires the use of force. The
gendered nature of state indicates that the sexualized forms of violence are a ready
option for defending and maintaining its masculinity. The militaristic nature of state’s
masculinity also emphasizes the relevance of armed conflict to the exertion of such
violence. While sexual violence is instrumental in exerting the state’s masculinity, it
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needs to be implemented by individuals. Consequently, during armed conflict state
masculinity can generate a strategic preference for sexual violence implemented by
individuals to uphold, defend, and strengthen the prototype masculinity of state.
The paradox is, that while sexual violence is a useful instrument for advancing
sates masculinity, and hence virility and dominance, nevertheless, state has
recognized sexual violence in armed conflict as a crime under international law. To
resolve this paradox, this essay will argue that it is not inconsistent, but actually fits
the logic of the state’ acts for its own hegemonic, normative masculine power. This
essay will explain this motive of state by tracing the process of how the sexual
violence against females was securitized. This process demonstrated how recognition
and prosecution of sexual violence against females was permitted and initiated by
males to demonize the enemy’s soldiers, thus demonstrating the lack of self-discipline
– the “gentlemen” aspect of masculinity – compared to the greater masculine integrity
of the prosecuting states.
In contrast, the states lack motivation to push the agenda of recognizing sexual
violence against males in armed conflict because the political cost outweighs political
gain. Therefore, the male victims have only been recognized under the category of
torture by international community.
The essay is organized as follows: first it lays out the definition of sexual
violence drawing on legal authorities. Then it demonstrates the insufficiency of
current literature about sexual violence against males in armed conflict. After that it
defines the state and hegemonic masculinity, and explains how the state becomes
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gendered through the process of state formation. The gendering of the state through its
formation then helps explain the role of state masculinity in facilitating and
sanctioning the adoption of sexual violence against males in armed conflict by
individual perpetrators. The following section provides case analyses from
testimonies of ICYT that demonstrate the indispensable role of the state in explaining
the occurrence of sexual violence in that horrific conflict. After illustrating the cases
of sexual violence during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the next section will
trace the process of securitization of sexual violence to demonstrate how
securitization of sexual violence in armed conflict continues to serve to enhance the
states’ masculinity. The last part concludes with implications for further research.
Theorizing Sexual Violence
In order to address the issue of sexual violence in conflict, it is important to
categorize what constitutes sexual violence. Although there is no single, unanimously
agreed definition of sexual violence, this essay finds two definitions that are helpful in
shedding lights in this domain. The first one is highlighted by McDougall, the Special
Rapporteur in her report to the United Nations, which defines sexual violence as:
“Any violence, physical or psychological, carried out through sexual means or
by targeting sexuality…including both physical and psychological attacks
directed at a person’s sexual characteristics such as forcing a person to strip
naked in public, mutilating a person’s genitals, or slicing off a woman’s
breasts…situations in which two victims are forced to perform sexual acts on
one another or to harm one another in a sexual manner” (McDougall, United

Muyi Yang 10
Nations, 2000).
The second one is from the International Criminal Court concerning crimes
against humanity. Sharing the coercive and sexual emphasis, the Elements of Crimes
of Article 7 (1) (g)-3 Crime against humanity of enforced prostitution are used to
assist the International Criminal Court in interpreting the crime against humanity of
sexual violence as:
“An act of a sexual nature against one or more persons or causes such person
or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force
or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention,
psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or
another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such
person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent” (Elements of Crimes,
ICC).
In addition, some domestic law definition can elaborate on the ambiguous
terminology in aforementioned definitions like “an act of a sexual nature”. The
section 78 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 of the United Kingdom, for example,
clarifies that
“…activity is sexual if a reasonable person would consider that (a) whatever
the circumstances or any person’s purpose in relation to it, it is because of its
nature sexual, or (b) because of its nature it may be sexual and because of the
circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is
sexual” (Section 78: Sexual, Sexual Offences Act 2003, U.K.).
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Accordingly, this essay categorizes sexual violence as not only those acts that
involve an explicit intention to satiate the sexual whim of the perpetrators but acts that
“embraces both physical and psychological attacks directed at a person’s sexual
characteristics while also encompassing all serious abuses of a sexual nature inflicted
upon the physical or moral integrity of a person by means of coercion, threat of force
or intimidation in a way that is degrading and humiliating for the victim’s dignity”
(Mitchell 2005). As this essay is mainly focused on sexual violence against male
victims during conflict, there are certain methods of sexual violence, such as forced
pregnancy, that are gender specific and may not apply to male victims. However, as
the following part will elaborate, the underlying rationalities of using those methods is
not necessarily gender specific because they all serve the same purpose of upholding
and furthering the dominance of state masculinity—the ultimate entity that demands
those ramifications of sexual violence tactics.
Insufficiency of current explanation
The high prevalence of sexual violence against males noted earlier clearly
suggests the dire need of wider exposure and also deeper research on explaining the
occurrence of sexual violence against males in conflict. However, the current focus is
largely on the individuals, portraying perpetrators as the power center to exert their
masculine supremacy.
For example, Meger claims that “sexual violence effeminizes the victim and
asserts the power and superior masculinity of the perpetrator” (Meger 2016).
Similarly, in Straight as a Rule, Adams Jones asserts that while man is afraid of
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having a traditionally feminine role and behavior imposed on him, and thus becoming
that “feminized male Other”, this “feminized male Other” is indispensable to
construct and reaffirm the righteous masculinity of the rest of the men (Jones 2006).
Based on this individual-centered masculinity, he further argues that the underlying
dynamic of gender roles is reflected in male-on-male rape in that during this maleagainst-male sexual violence, the perpetrator “…finds his masculinity…actually
reinforced” (Jones 2006). However, as he later argues that sexual violence against
males in armed conflict is used to feminize not only the victim but also, and more
importantly, the group to which “the sexually assaulted male belongs” (Jones 2006).
As he cites Zarkov:
“When the male body is ethnic and male at the same time, the castration of a
single man of the ethnically defined enemy is symbolic appropriation of the
masculinity of the whole group. Sexual humiliation of a man from another
ethnicity is, thus, a proof not only that he is a lesser man, but also that his
ethnicity is a lesser ethnicity. Emasculation annihilates the power of the ethnic
others by annihilating the power of its men’s masculinity” (Zarkov 2001).
As depicted above, sexual violence has been employed as a tool of
“feminizing of the victim and a more profound valorizing of the heterosexual virility
of the assailant and, by implication, his ethnic group” (Jones 2006). However, if it is
the individual perpetrators who exert their masculine authority, then it begs the
question of what the process is by which the masculinity of the individual transforms
into the valorized ethnic, or even national masculinity. In other words, if individual
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men are the main actor of dominant masculinity, is sexual violence weaponized to
confirm their individualized masculine hierarchy, and is their ethnic group only an
extension of their individual masculinity?
However, evidence suggests that collective masculinity is not an extension of
individual masculinity but indeed the opposite: individual masculinity is a
manifestation of collective masculinity. For example, during a documented rape in the
former Yugoslavia war a Serb soldier berates his victim: “What happened Turk?
You’re deflowered?” (Boose 2002). These words uttered by a perpetrator during an
act of sexual violence show that the perpetrators are not showing off their own
masculinity. Hence, it is more likely that sexual violence is an instrument adopted by
individual perpetrators to assert and reinforce a masculinity of a bigger, collective
entity, such as their ethnic or national community to which they belong. Therefore, the
perpetrators are reaffirming the masculinity of that entity, and by extension
reinforcing their own individual masculine identity.
The specific methods of sexual violence against males also attest to its
functionality of asserting masculine rule on the collective level. For example, Carlson
argues that during the Yugoslavia war sexual violence against males, specifically
trauma to the male genitalia was used by Serbs to systematically destroy the
reproductive function of men and prevent the birth of Bosnian (Muslim) babies as a
whole (Carlson 2005). The underlying aim of ethnic cleansing against a whole group
shows again that sexual violence reflects more than the affirmation of individuals’
masculine dominance, but rather, a normative masculinity on a collective level that is
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represented via individual perpetrators, despite their physical gender and sex (Linos
2009). The involvement of female perpetrators further attests to insufficiency and
inconsistency of current individual-centric argument. Namely, it is absurd to claim
that those female perpetrators are using sexual violence against males to assert and
reinforce their own image of masculinity. For those female perpetrators, emasculating
the male victims is not about the perpetrators but about a larger masculine power
dynamic.
Therefore, this individual-centric argument begs several questions in
deciphering the underlying collective, state-level dynamic that fosters sexual violence
in the armed conflict. First, such argument analogizes sexual violence against males in
armed conflict to those incidents in peaceful time. However, there is significant
difference between the sexual violence against males in armed conflict and that in
peaceful time. For example, as demonstrated by the documents listed above, sexual
violence in armed conflict was often committed when there was audience because
sexual violence is an instrumental in effeminizing the whole community, rather than
only the victim himself. In contrast, sexual violence in peaceful times emphasizes on
privacy. Secondly, the normative masculinity emphasizes on the virile, reproductive
power that is essentially heterosexual. If the individual perpetrators want to exert their
own masculinity, then sexual violence against their male peers is actually counterproductive for the potentially homoerotic implication of such conduct. Similarly, such
argument fails to explain how the female perpetrators expand their own masculinity
by committing sexual violence against males in armed conflict. What’s more, while
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some scholars contend that in armed conflict individuals perpetrate sexual violence
against males to appropriate the masculinity of a whole group through individual’s
experiences, they only focus on the agency of the individual perpetrators and thus fail
to explain that how the masculinity – or lack thereof - could lead to the strengthening
– or deprivation – of the masculinity of a collective community.
In addition to personal masculinization, Meger proposes that sexual violence
“serves material gains” (Meger 2016). She argues that in “economic civil wars”,
sexual violence is instrumentalized to enforce the “submission of the group or
invoking sufficient fear to displace entire communities to facilitate access of the
perpetrating group to land, resources, and other materials that may be of strategic
interest” (Meger 2016). Notwithstanding the existence of some perpetrators who
“…see armed conflict as an opportunity for personal gain”, this explanation is also
insufficient to account for the occurrence of sexual violence in armed conflict against
males in general. Focused on the material aspect of the warring party, Wood argues
that violence against civilians in general is potentially associated with “belligerents’
war strategies” to determine their calculus of power distribution based on military
capabilities (Wood 2014). However, the result of his research demonstrates that the
greater the reliance of an insurgent group on popular mobilization for physical
resources and material support, the less likely the civilian victimization would occur
(Wood 2014). This implies that if there is indeed a material need from the combatants
to extract resources from the other side, then it is even less likely that the soldiers
would diminish the support from the civilians by sexually abusing them. Like other
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violence in armed conflict, sexual violence “requires the sustenance of a similar
character of targeted violence for periods of time and in multiple locations” (Straus
2015). For example, if it is the material gain like taxation or food supply that the
insurgent groups want to obtain, then sexually abusing the victims is likely to shrink
the taxing or labor basis, which is counter-intuitive. In a nutshell, when there is
already a need for materials based on popular support, wasting more resources on
committing sexual violence would be only counter-productive in enticing support. It
is even worse than rather simply killing the victims and therefore does not comply
with the logic of material gain.
Hegemonic Normative Masculinity
As demonstrated in the above section, masculinity has been at the center of
academic analyses of sexual violence. It is therefore important to have a conceptual
framework of the definition of masculinity. To demonstrate so, it is imperative to first
look into the question: what constitutes masculinity.
Feminist scholars have located masculinity studies with a worldview of the
“social world as molded by power relations that create unevenly structured
opportunities and access to resources according to gender” (Fahlberg & Pepper 2016).
In a broad way, those scholars define masculinity as a “socially constructed set of
practices within a system of gender relations that is predicated upon unequal power
both between men and women and among men” (Fahlberg & Pepper 2016). This
definition highlights the fluid and relational process of constructing masculinity.
Concurringly, Gilmore looks into the cross-cultural conceptions of masculinity in
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Manhood in the Making and concludes that there is no universal consensus of what
constitutes real masculinity. However, he also adds that:
“Although there may be no “Universal Male”, we may perhaps speak of a
‘Ubiquitous Male’ based on these criteria of performance: . . . to be a man . . . one
must impregnate women, protect dependents [sic] from danger, and provision kith and
kin . . . We might call this quasi-global personage something like ‘Man-theImpregnator-Protector-Provider’” (Gilmore 1990).
As indicated, even though it might be true that the idea of masculinity is an
relational idea that relies on the process of masculinization and there is no
unanimously agreed thus fixed prototype of masculinity, it is acknowledged that “at
any time, in any place, there is an identifiable ‘normative’ masculinity that sets the
standards for male demeanor, thinking and action” (Nagel 1998; see also Bederman
1995, Connell 1995, Mosse 1996). Therefore, this essay will adopt the usage of
masculinity acknowledging that such idea of masculinity depends on the fluid and
relational feature of the process of masculinization. With such recognition of a
masculinizing process, this essay will focus on the “normative masculinity”
mentioned by Gilmore, namely, this identity of Man-the-Impregnator-ProtectorProvider (Gilmore 1990). Such an ideal of men becomes a standard that is more than
just an idealistic yardstick; it is “assumptive, widely held, and has the quality of
appearing to be ‘natural” (Nagel 1998; see also Donaldson 1993). In the end,
“hegemonic masculinity remains a standard to be always pursued– whether reviled or
revered – against which other masculinities compete or define themselves” (Nagel
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1998). Accordingly, this normative masculinity becomes the ideal model that enjoys
the position of hegemony to demarcate the proper conceptual and behavioral
parameter for other males who aspire to achieve such normative hegemonic
masculinity, thereby sanctioning their strategic preferences to correspondingly.
While such an image of man as “the-Impregnator-Protector-Provider” is
ubiquitous and normative, the specific behaviors that symbolize such normative
masculine features are culturally assigned. The political hegemony and the long
history of colonization of the U.S. and other European countries enabled the EuroU.S. ideal masculinity to spread around the world and make this specific
representation of the ubiquitous idea of masculinity the most accepted one. To be
more precise, the “US and European male codes of honor (Nye 1993)” emphasize a
number of “manly virtues” as “normative masculinity”, which includes “willpower,
honor, courage, discipline, competitiveness, quiet strength, stoicism, sang-froid,
persistence, adventurousness, independence, sexual virility tempered with restraint,
and dignity, and which reflected masculine ideals as liberty, equality, and fraternity”
(Nagel 1998; see also Bederman 1995, Mosse 1996). Based on late nineteenth-century
“ideals of manhood” in the middle-class northern U.S, Rotundo divided these
characteristics into three general groups: the “Masculine Achiever”, which includes
competitiveness, independence, persistence; the “Christian Gentleman” which refers
to willpower, restraint, discipline; and the “Masculine Primitive”, namely the strength,
virility, courage (Rotundo 1987). His division is demonstrative of the ubiquitous
normative masculinity. The “Masculine Primitive” indicates the innate, primitive
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capacity of virility that reflects the role of impregnator that is indispensable in
qualifying real masculinity (Rotundo 1987). To enlarge the scope of subjects for
impregnation, the normative masculinity becomes the adventurous “Masculine
Achiever” who aims at expansion, even via power – namely it indicates the ability to
exert power over others, to conquer and dominate. In contrast, for those who belongs
to “us”, the normative masculinity morphs into the form of “Christian Gentleman”
that emphasizes will power, self-control, and discipline to use the capacity to defend
itself and provide welfare for others (Rotundo 1987). Together with the depiction of
men being both impregnator and provider, including providing protection, the dualfeature of such normative masculinity becomes clear: man as both offender and
defender (but never protected), warfare initiator and welfare provider (but never selfclaimed provision receiver), abundant with physical strength of virile drive to
penetrate and expand while possessing independent will power to not only harness
such a primitive drive but also to switch such intruding power into strength of
protection.
In addition to defining what men are, ubiquitous masculinity regulates
masculine norms in “negative terms—what men are not” (Nagel 1998). Exemplified
and represented by the Euro-U.S. ideal, being a man “is not being a woman, and no
man would ever want to be a woman (Adams 1990; see also Chodorow 1978); a
distancing from masculine countertypes, whether racial – being a (white) man is not
being a Jew (see Green 1993 and Mosse 1996) or an Asian (see Espiritu 2008), or a
Bengali (see Sinha 1995), or an Indian or a black (see Bederman 1995), or sexual –
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being a man is not acting ‘feminine’ and/or not being a homosexual” (see also Mosse
1985, 1996, Duroche 1991, Donaldson 1993). Similarly, Connell provides a semiotic
definition of masculinity, which “contrast masculine and feminine and deduce from
the difference the meaning of masculinity (and femininity): ‘The phallus is mastersignifier, and femininity is symbolically defined by lack’” (Connell 1995). As Lisa
Price has written about the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, “I AM only to the extent
that you are not—male because you are female, Serb because you are Muslim, soldier
because you are civilian. Your absence marks, verifies my presence and your pain
becomes my power” (Price 2001).
Together with the positive depiction of normative masculinity, these
definitions of “what men are not” demonstrate the relational feature of normative
masculinity during its construction and maintenance which requires constant selfmasculinizing through feminizing others. This dynamic shows that the boundary
between masculinity and lack thereof is flexible and beyond the aspect of physical
gender, in that the criteria of masculinity could be applied as long as the subject could
be constructed to be feminized. The weight of other factors mentioned above – race,
ethnicity, or sexuality – is negotiable and negotiated under specific context for
masculinization or feminization. Each factor could be gendered individually in
measuring the degree of masculinity. They could also work complementarily to justify
the qualification of the person as the agency of normative masculinity—the dominant
us, or expel someone from being recognized as a representative of generic manliness,
thus making them the inferior other. Correspondingly, not only can females be
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excluded from ever possessing masculinity, males—as long as they are believed to
have failed to live up to those normative standards – can also be excluded. In this way,
being male does not always benefit that person by automatically granting him the
immunity of being feminized.
To see how state becomes the embodiment of such hegemonic normative
masculinity, it is imperative to demonstrate first that the state is an ideational entity
that is superior to the governmental institutions like administrative and military
agencies, as well as to the individuals living within the state.
Focusing mainly on modern armed conflicts, the next section of this essay will
demonstrate how modern state is a gendered, ideational entity.
State
In War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, Charles Tilly et al. et
al. argues that “[w]ar makes [modern] state” (Tilly et al. 1985). Tilly et al. uses the
European experience of the past centuries to demonstrate that the state was initially
formed to facilitate better “…[w]ar making, [revenue] extraction, and capital
accumulation…” for power holders. Based on Tilley’s argument, to better use state for
personal gains, statesmen establish institutions like administrative and military
agencies. These institutions are mere conduit of enforcement power granted by
statesmen upon state which ultimately serve those individual purposes like war
waging and taxation.
Tilley’s depiction of state as mere tool of enforcement for statesmen’s personal
gains resonate with that of the German sociologist Max Weber. Weber famously
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defines the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of
the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (Weber et al. 1948). His
definition highlights two components of which state consists: a given territory and
legitimate use of physical force. Enjoying this demarcated boundary, the state was
made to not only wage better wars to “check or overcome their competitors”, but also
to enjoy the advantages of power within a secure or expanding territory” (Tilly et al.
1985). As Tilly et al. emphasizes, states offer protection against the threats that are
“imaginary or are consequences of its own activities”, for states “themselves
commonly simulate, stimulate, or even fabricate threats of external war” (Tilly et al.
1985). Collecting taxation revenue, states are essentially “racketeers” that threaten the
population with violence then sell the protection from themselves.
However, Tilly et al.’s argument confuses the position of the state vis-à-vis
individuals as well as governmental institutions like administrative and military
agency. Bob Jessop points out the paradox that if “the state just one institutional
ensemble among others within a social formation,” then how could the state be
“peculiarly charged with overall responsibility for maintaining the cohesion of the
social formation of which it is a part” (Jessop 1978). Namely, the state has to be more
than just one institutional ensemble - a conceptual entity to be more precise, to guide
institutions for the maintenance of social cohesion. In this sense, the institutions
within a demarcated territory have various relationships to and also under the state.
To better demonstrate that the state is an ideational entity preceding and superior to
institutions, it is helpful to draw on the argument from William Munro. Although
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Munro elaborates on the definition of state as an “institutional ensemble”, he points
out that it is “a framework [that such institutional ensemble provides] within which
the normative postulations of territoriality, nationality, and sovereignty” reside, rather
than the institutions per se (Munro 1998). Poggi further demonstrate the ideational
essence of state by saying that, after its formation, “[f]or all its structural complexity
and the vastness and continuity of its operations, the modern state – like any other
institutional complex – resolves ultimately into social processes patterned by certain
rules” (Poggi 1978). Those rules are conceived and conceptualized that covers the
whole territory, symbolizing what Munro describes as the “universality” of state that
is independent from the ongoing political struggles related and channeled by the
institutions. This universality leads to the concept of state power which itself
constitutes part of an accepted understanding that state is “larger than “its
agglomerated institutions, their incumbents, or the social groups that dominate society
through it” (Munro 1998). Implying such a superior position to institutions and
statesmen, Munro points out that the state draws its authority “from social
conventions that define the location of the state in the social order”, namely, “state
hegemony” (Munro 1998).
Therefore, although similar to Tilly et al.’s argument, Munro also highlights
“…the generation of revenue, the management of society, and the accomplishment of
allegiance…” as three purposive logics that underline the state’s actions, the state’s
hegemony determines that these three purposive logics are for the survival and benefit
of the state, rather than the power-maker.
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Although the state precedes and generates, and re-defines institutions within
its territory, its existence and power rests upon and is evaluated by the strength of its
institutions. More than “simply the conduits of political or economic power” (Munro,
1998), the institutions are manifestation of the state. As an ideational entity, the state
generates institutions to represent and bolster itself. To ensure the survival of this
ideational entity, the institutions develop their own norms and rules as ramifications
of this ideational entity. Nonetheless, this only assures that the existence of the state
precedes and shapes the institutions within a state’s territory.
Similar to Benedict Anderson’s idea of imagined community, this definition of
state emphasizes in the essence that the state is an ideational entity that generates
institutions to exert its power and further its interests within a defined range of
territory. Such ideational emphasis – the purposive logics for Munro or social
processes for Poggi – correspond with Jessop’s argument of “the cohesion of the
social formation” that the state aims to maintain, for such cohesion is derived from
and represents the existence of the state. However, rather being imagined, the
normative postulates of the state is rather believed, or even assumed. This assumed
acceptance of state’s postulates gives meaning to its subjects, both institutions and
individuals
This universal and superior position of the state is further demonstrated by its
role as the premise in which the nation could be rooted. Max Weber defines a nation
as “a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state’ and
which holds notions of common descent, though not necessarily common blood
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(Weber et al. 1948). Gellner and Breuilly concurs that “it is nationalism that
engenders nations, and not the other way around” (Gellner & Breuilly 1983). Layoun
also shares this idea of the emphasis of nationalist sentiment needed to initiate state
building, for she claims that nationalism “constructs and proffers a narrative of the
‘nation’ and of its relation to an already existing or potential state” (Layoun 1991).
Together, their definition of nationalist sentiment, or nationalism, implies “both a goal
– to achieve statehood, and a belief – in collective commonality” (Nagel 1998).
The Gendered State:
However, the state is not simply an ideational entity. It is a gendered ideational
entity. In Tilly et al.’s argument, those power holders who form the state for
racketeering are invariably males. Accordingly, states are initially formed by men (in
a gendered sense), because of men, and therefore for men. Therefore, the state has
been gendered, or more precisely, masculinized, from the very beginning of its
building. This gendered feature is deeply embedded in the existence of the state as an
ideational entity and transferred to and reinforced and reproduced by its institutions
during its maintaining and, if necessary, its defense as well as its expansion. The
generated idea of nationhood and nationalist sentiment further harbor and reproduce
such masculinized feature of state. Thus such sentiment is by its essence a
masculinized sentiment.
In Bananas, Beaches, and Bases, Cynthia Enloe demonstrates that
“nationalism has typically sprung from masculinized memory, masculinized
humiliation and masculinized hope” (Enloe 1990). For Enloe, the “real actors” of state
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building “are men who are defending their freedom, their honour, their homeland and
their women” (Nagel 1998, emphasis added). The absolute absence of women in this
whole discourse of state-building highlights the belief that the state-building is a
process, a method, in which only “heroic men struggle to tame a wild, dangerous, and
essentially feminized anarchy” (for it’s being dominated by virile while
simultaneously civilized men) (the “disordered and natural realm of anarchy itself as
feminine” (Hooper 2001).
Concurringly, in her book Gender in International Relations, Ann Tickner
cites Machiavelli’s picture of men to demonstrate the gendering process of statebuilding when men “wished to have dominion over…the feminine state of nature or
anarchy” (Tickner 1998). Therefore, from the very start the state-building project has
been dictated by the masculinized intention with the dual implication of masculine
nationalism: the demarcation of a masculine Us versus feminine Other. Furthermore,
the dominance of men in the design of the state’s structure and its maintenance in
high-level offices have determined that the state “by default…ha[s] reflected the
interests and activities of men” and “celebrates interest and values that are associated
with masculinity” (Hooper 2001). Therefore, upheld by men who monopolize the
state building and maintenance, this normative masculinity genders statehood
formation through policing the gender role of statesmen.
However, while it sounds like the state is only a vehicle that represents the
interests and services at the whim of its principals, to the statesmen, the state is not a
mere instrument that compiles and facilitates the interests of statesmen. By
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dominating the state-building process and narratives, statesmen, with their
unswerving pursuance of the normative ideal of masculinity, establish the state and its
institutions based on those masculine norms. The resulting state is thus the
embodiment of a prototype masculinity: an adventurous, virile, and heroic warfare
initiator to conquer the feminized and uncivilized, and a stoic, disciplined, rational
welfare provider that is capable of warding against the barbaric, unruly, and othered –
and thus feminized –enemies. In a word, the state becomes the normative masculinity.
As the embodiment of the normative masculinity, state stops representing the interests
of males but starts to dictate the interests of statesmen that are derived from and thus
subordinated to the interests of state. As a result, the state becomes the principal of
normative masculinity, and the individuals the agents that represent, defend, and
attempt to emulate, but never succeed.
Although originally proposed for international relation theory, Wendt’s logic
of internalization is actually conducive to complement this multi-layer approach of
hierarchal power dynamic. Borrowing Wendt’s idea, to internalize an idea it
necessitates three steps: coercion, self-interests, and receptiveness, with coercion
referring to forceful imposition of the conformity, self-interests referring to obedience
out of practical personal concern, receptiveness means to internalize the value and
voluntarily act on it (Wendt 1999). Based on this argument, the individuals go through
these three stages of internalizing and prioritizing the interests of the state masculinity
over their own. This recognition of the state as the embodiment of normative
masculinity also resonates with the Weberian definition of state, which claims that the
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“…state is usually defined either as a specific set of social institutions, for instance, as
that body which has the monopoly over legitimate coercion in given territory, or in
terms of its function, for instance, that body which maintains social cohesion in a
class society” (Walby 1990). However, Walby questions such a state-centric definition
in that based on this definition, “…are violent men part of the state, or does the state
not have a monopoly over legitimate coercion” (Walby 1990)? Walby challenges that
the state does not have monopoly of legitimate coercion because the agent of coercion
is an individual male. Her claim misconstrues the principal-agent relationship
between the state and the individual perpetrators of violence. The gendered state is the
principal that embodies the collectively idealized and idolized masculinity, and the
individuals who commit sexual violence as agents of their principal, the state. Her
questions reveal the dire consequence of ignoring the role of the state as the
embodiment of normative masculinity. The individual violent man, who uses
violence, is thus only representative of the state who indirectly conducts violence via
the hands of that man.
State Masculinity and Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict.
Since the enforcement power is indispensable for state to both wage wars and
defend itself, militarism is fundamental for state to exert its masculine power. .
Indeed, the normative narrative of masculinity cited above makes it almost impossible
to talk about state masculinity without alluding to militarism. Through what Nagel
calls “sexualized militarism”, the establishment of the state as well as the
“maintenance and exercise of statehood vis-à-vis other nation-states often takes the
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form of “armed conflict”(Nagel 1998). Accordingly, militarism emphasizes the
contextual relevance of armed conflict to construct and also manifest masculine
statehood.
Since the legitimacy of the state’s monopoly in using violence is inextricable
from the privilege of embodying the hegemonic normative masculinity, the state could
always legitimize its need of violent tactics for militaristic duties burdened by and
also serving to maintain the normative masculinity, whether the state acts as warfare
initiator or welfare provider. In addition, among all the forms of legitimized violence
prescribed by state masculinity, sexual violence as a gendered violence is the most
pertinent approach that speaks to the ultimate purpose of those violent tactics – the
defense and extension of the state’s masculine authority through feminizing its
opponents.
While sexual violence becomes preferred instrument for state to exert its
masculinity in armed conflict, such violent tactics requires implementation by
individual agents, the violent men as Walby (1990) describes them. In dealing with
female victimization through sexual violence, scholars have argued that “[a]s men
seek to reify their masculinity through compulsive heterosexuality, the lines between
consensual and coercive sexual activity are either blurred or ignored and women’s
right to bodily integrity become secondary to men’s socially constructed entitlement
to women’s bodies” (Fahlberg & Pepper 2016). This hierarchical prioritization of
consent and coercion also prevails throughout sexual violence against males during
conflict. In conflict, not only is the boundary between victim’s consent and non-
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consent for sexual activity blurred and twisted by the perpetrator’s coercion, but also
the boundary between the “compulsive heterosexuality” (Fahlberg & Pepper 2016) of
the masculine normativity conformed by individual agents and the homoerotic
implication of the sexual violence committed by these individuals. If it were
completely up to those individual agents, they would not commit sexual violence
against male victims because it violates the underlying heteronormativity that
underwrites normative masculinity. However, because individuals have submitted
their own masculinity to the superior normative masculinity of the state, committing
sexual violence against males as a means to satisfy the interests of their state to
feminize other states and collective actors surmounts the cost from violating the
personal heteronormativity. Consequently, as a representative agent of the state, the
individual subordinates the personal hetero need to the paramount demand of
defending and promoting the state’s heteronormative masculinity and adopts the
homoerotic form of sexual violence against males.
The shifted prioritization of interests from the personal one to that of the state
bears the negotiated compatibility between the homoerotic tactics of sexual violence
by individuals against males and the strategic functionality of upholding a
heteronormative masculinity of state. The sexual tactics against males, which would
normally be considered debilitating and counter-masculine for male perpetrators’
personal manliness, then become rationalized as acceptable or sometimes necessary
methods to elevate the heteronormative masculinity of his ultimate master, the state.
With the state’s masculinity prioritized over a personal one, the perpetrators are no
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longer coerced into breaking their masculine integrity by doing sexual violence
against their male peers. Rather, the individual perpetrators have consented,
volunteered, into taking up those homoerotic means – sexual violence against males –
to serve a heterosexual end.
Various Forms of Sexual Violence against Males
Although scattered, the documents and reports of sexual violence against
males reveal various forms of such violence that fit the aforementioned definition.
Among those forms are: “…oral and anal penetrative rapes with a penis, another body
part, or an object...” by the perpetrators, as well as “genital violence and mutilation”
(Lewis 2009). Additionally, enforced sterilization, such as castration, is another
related form of sexual violence suffered by men in armed conflict. Apart from those
methods, the enforced sexual conduct is also documented, including enforced
masturbation, enforced fellatio, and enforced rape or sexual contact, including with a
family member or the dead (Lewis 2009).
As Lewis claims, violations of certain cultural norms can also act as sexual
violations in wartime. Incidents like “forcing male family members to rape female
family members or to watch them dance naked or be raped by others” (Wood 2006)
precisely carry “increased shame for the victim precisely because these violations
combine physical abuse with psychological torment” (Lewis 2009).
To better demonstrate with empirical cases how the state’s masculinity
underwrites sexual violence against males in armed conflict, the following part will
examine various forms of sexual violence using representative evidence from the
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testimonies of International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. With this
evidence, the analysis will demonstrate how various forms of sexual violence against
males serve to enhance state’s masculinity.
Rape:
Rape against males here refers to the anal penetrative rapes with a penis,
another body part, or an object. As a method that involves direct invasion of the
victim’s body, rape represents the invasive and thus dominant power of masculinity.
Thus even though impaling foreign objects into body parts like anus does not involve
direct genital penetration from the perpetrators to the reproductive organ of the victim,
such behavior still demonstrates the sexual nature of such violence, namely the ability
and authority to violate the victim’s body through penetration. This is demonstrated
by an account given by a Prosecution witness in the Blagoje Simić trial judgment that
involved “ramming a police truncheon in the anus of a detainee” (see Prosecutor v.
Blagoje Simić). Here the symbolic meaning of penetration by perpetrator to victim,
regardless of the actual object, is more important than the involvement of sexual
organs because ultimately such behavior signifies that the state to which the
perpetrators belong penetrates, and thus dominates, that to which the victims belong.
As a method of sexual violence in conflict, rape, like other sexual violence in conflict,
is systematic and public. The systematic feature indicates the penetrative domination
represented is not about the single perpetrator. The perpetrators manifest the
dominance underlying virile capacity manifesting itself through a relational power
dynamic depicted alongside the group boundaries that are demarcated by state
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identity. Correspondingly, the object is not just to victimize the direct targets but
indeed the whole community represented by the targets.
As a whole, rape as a method of sexual violence serves to represent the
penetrative dominance of normative masculinity to that of the effeminized enemy
state. This is clearly demonstrated in the documented cases from former Yugoslavia
conflict. In fact, as Boose points out, the rationale of the whole conflict was built on a
national myth of gendered victimization, or to be more precise, the humiliation
inflicted upon Serbia’s state masculinity. The defeat of the Serbs by the Ottoman
Empire in 1389 marked the beginning of Serbian history-making with “Turk at the
center of Serb cultural memory, where, infuriatingly, he threatens to conquer,
victimize, feminize, and humiliate Serb national selfhood (always a masculine
construct)” (Boose 2008). More precisely, the feminization and victimization were
achieved through the “practice of impalement” by the Turks to the masculine national
identity of Serbs because “[t]hat impalement is always refigured in Serb cultural
memory as a rape by the Turk” (Boose 2008). Similarly, Ivo Andrić’, in his classic
fiction The Bridge on the Drina that is based on the historical account of Ottoman’s
conquest of Serbia, repetitively mentioned the impalement inflicted by Turkish
soldiers upon Serbs as an instrument and strategy for public humiliation. For example,
in one scenario Andrić described how a Turkish guard, Abidaga, gave orders to torture
the interrogated a Serb but not “…beyond endurance lest he die…so that at noon that
same day he should be impaled alive on the outermost part of the construction work at
its highest point so that the whole town and all the workers should be able to see him
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from the banks of the river” (Andrić 1959).This impaled, penetrated image feminized
the statehood of Serbia by proving its lack of capability for self-defense. Through this
emasculation, Serbia’s state masculinity Serbs lost both its role as warfare initiator as
well as its role as welfare provider.
Rather than accepting the victimized and feminized image of their state, the
Serbs “…celebrate[d] a defeat as the cradle of their nationhood;” namely, as the start
to establish the embodiment of the normative masculinity, which requires to reverse
the feminization and victimization from the impaled past to restore the normative
masculinity of the Serbian state. Such reversing called for reparation of a feminized
and victimized national history that involves “return, repetition, and revenge” (Boose
2008). It needs to reverse the victimization and feminization that given the weight of
the impalement in the construction of victimized nationhood, the memory of
impalement – rape by Turks – “so thoroughly justifies any act of revenge”, and more
importantly, explains “why rape should have become unconsciously the most
appropriate form for Serb revenge” (Boose 2008). In a word, the impaled – raped –
nationhood needs reparation that demands its agents to take revenge which included,
and favored, raping the victimizer’s agents. In so doing, the victimization was not
only neutralized but also became domination, and the state’s normative masculinity
was restored.
Combined with rationalizing Bosnian Muslims as “Turks because of the
conversion of their ancestors to Islam”, the demand for restoring the normative
masculinity of statehood then explained the sexual violence committed by Serbs upon
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Bosnian Muslims. Given the “determining power of the impalement myth and the
way it encodes the Turkish conqueror’s rape of Serbian masculinity,” raping enemy
males thus became the “logically accomplish reciprocity” that both avenged –
cancelled out – a past feminization and re-established a new normative masculinity
(Boose 2008). Faruk’s experience exactly demonstrates that logic. After a group of
Serb irregulars arrived at Faruk’s farm, the senior one sent the others off on a
fictitious errand and then forced Faruk into the cowshed, where he raped him,
mocking him as he did, “What happened Turk? You’re deflowered?” (Vranic 1996).
His ordeal continued when the “Serb soldiers tried to humiliate Faruk by forcing him
to sexually penetrate a sheep. Beaten unconscious for refusing, Faruk was awakened
later that night by the excruciating pain of an iron pole being pushed into his backside,
again by the senior soldier. This time, the sexual violence was formulated as a group
act involving all ten Serb soldiers’ pinning him to the ground and collectively jeering,
‘Turk’” (Vranic 1996). By calling Faruk “Turk” while inflicting the pain of sexual
violence upon him, the Serb soldiers were using him as the representative of the real
target they wanted to wreak vengeance upon—the state of “Turk”. Therefore, as
demonstrated, those soldiers were exerting the masculinity of their state even by
raping the victim that was only imaged to represent another state. They were avenging
– raping – on behalf their state. By doing so, they represented the penetrative power,
the superior dominance, of their state masculinity.
Not only was raping “Turk” male victims used to feminize the enemy state,
but raping Muslim female victims was also, at least partly, used as a means to achieve
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the same end. Raping Muslim women indicates the indirect defeat and humiliation of
Muslim males, for women’s bodies had been constructed by the patriarchal culture as
property signifying the honor of the male community. Like penetrating the male
victims would directly rip apart the integrity of masculinity of the state to which the
victims belong, raping the female victims shows the inability to protect their
propertied women. This failure demonstrates the impotence of the enemy state to live
up to its role as welfare provider and also its defeat in defending its own property,
thus rendering it dominated and feminized.
In addition, virility is an essential part that constitutes normative masculinity.
Therefore, normative masculinity has an emphasis on reproduction. This emphasis has
two components: the ability to reproduce, and more importantly, to monopolize in
reproduction. Besides showing off the penetrative dominance of masculinity, systemic
rape in conflict against female victims could serve to promote forced pregnancy,
which demonstrates the virility of the normative masculinity of the state. The forceful
impregnation of women not only shows the dominance by the perpetrator’s state over
another state through symbolic penetration, as illustrated in the previous section of
this essay, but also demonstrates the virility of the perpetrator’s state. What’s more,
making those women the birth-giving machine of the reproduction of perpetrator’s
state demonstrates this state’s absolute and exclusive privilege in reproduction. In
other words, through impregnating the women of the enemy state, the perpetrators
demonstrate it is only the state they represent that is able to and ought to reproduce.
This logic resonates with Boose’s argument that systematic rape has been used as a
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“strategic tool of ethnic cleansing” (Boose 2002). The rape camps of the Bosnian war
have been documented as a “…systematically planned Serb instrument of genocide
designed not merely to encourage the evacuation of all non-Serbs but to destroy
parent-child and spousal bonds and render large numbers of the society’s childbearing women contaminated and thus unmarriageable” (Boose 2002).
Castration:
However, raping is not the only method for a state to deprive an enemy state of its
own virility and demonstrate its own reproductive privilege. If it is to get rid of the
reproductive power of the enemy – to emasculate -- then literally the more logical
method could be to damage the symbol that represents such reproductive power,
namely the genitals of male enemies. As the male genital symbolizes the phallic pride
of masculinity, the inability of male victims to protect their phallic pride directly
demonstrates the loss of that pride, specifically by the victorious state. Therefore,
damaging the male genitals directly symbolizes deprivation of the virile capacity and
reproductive power of the enemy state, resulting in feminization of the enemy state.
The adoption of this method in conflict “dates back to ancient times with ancient
Persian murals showing triumphant warriors marching along bearing plates piled high
with their enemy’s penises” (Sivakumaran 2007). Drawing on more details, this
instrumental feature of targeting male genitals to feminize the enemy state is best
represented by allegations made by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina before
the International Court of Justice. As demonstrated below, the perpetrators sometimes
directly target male victims’ genitals, with methods ranging from beating up to
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outright castration:
“They were hitting me, as well as others, in the testicles, using metal hampers,
metal bars, kicking with the boots. My testicles were swollen, the size of large
oranges . . . Serb torturers would beat us, step or jump on us until they tired out.
They were deliberately aiming their beatings at our testicles saying ’you’ll never
make Muslim children again’” (see Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia, Serbia
and Montenegro, Oral Proceedings of Bosnia and Herzegovina, CR 2006/06, 51,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/10596.pdf).
In that account, the perpetrators specifically said “Muslim Children”, indicating that
they were targeting the victim’s genital with the exact purpose of destroying the
reproduction of a whole group that is the enemy of the perpetrator’s state.
In addition to the direct reference to the enemy’s reproductive capacity, the
following two cases involve outright castration, highlighting the damage to the phallic
symbol of masculine integrity. Probably the most infamous and gruesome case that
demonstrates such instrumental logic was that of Tadić in ICTY:
“The fourth and last body of evidence relating to this paragraph of the Indictment
concerns Fikret Harambasic and chronologically follows immediately after the
attacks on the above three victims. After G and Witness H had been forced to pull
Jasmin Hrnićs body about the hangar floor they were ordered to jump down into
the inspection pit, then Fikret Harambasić, who was naked and bloody from
beating, was made to jump into the pit with them and Witness H was ordered to
lick his naked bottom and G to suck his penis and then to bite his testicles.
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Meanwhile a group of men in uniform stood around the inspection pit watching
and shouting to bite harder. All three were then made to get out of the pit onto the
hangar floor and Witness H was threatened with a knife that both his eyes would
be cut out if he did not hold Fikret Harambasić’s mouth closed to prevent him
from screaming; G was then made to lie between the naked Fikret Harambasić’s
legs and, while the latter struggled, hit and bite his genitals. G then bit off one of
Fikret Harambasić’s testicles and spat it out and was told he was free to leave.
Witness H was ordered to drag Fikret Harambasić to a nearby table, where he
then stood beside him and was then ordered to return to his room, which he did.
Fikret Harambasić has not been seen or heard of since” (see Prosecutor v. Duško
Tadić, Opinion and Judgment, IT-94-1-T, para. 206).
The case cited above also documented similar genital abuse and castration:
“I saw how Muslims were forced to bite each other’s testicles off, their mouth
filled with testicles and blood, ripped blood vessels sticking out of their mouths”
(also see Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, Oral
Proceedings of Bosnia and Herzegovina, CR 2006/06, 51, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/10596.pdf)).
Notwithstanding the involvement of humiliation in general, targeting specifically the
victims’ genitals in the case presented above symbolizes the dominance of the state
represented by the perpetrators that has trampled over the most phallic pride of the
enemy’s masculinity. More importantly, the inter-connected logic of genital abuse of
male victims to certain forms of sexual violence against female victims further
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signifies that the rationale behind raping in war does not have to be inherently sexual
in either exclusively male or female. The cognitive role of the body comes alive when
it mediates in the dispersal of certain knowledge, and a violated body “mirrors the
impotency of the victim and by default the powerlessness and impotency of the
community that it represents” (Misra 2015). Hence, a body that has retained its
untainted character is a threat, a reminder to the violator that the owner of this body is
free, whereas a violated body—male or female—becomes a “critical mouthpiece for
the violators’ objective” (Misra 2015).
Other forms
There are other forms of sexual violence that do not fit cleanly within the
categories listed above. For example, apart from the forms of rape in which
“…perpetrators may anally rape victims themselves, using objects,” there are different
forms of male rape that occur in armed conflict in which “[v]ictims may be forced to
perform fellatio on their perpetrators or on one another; or force victims to rape fellow
victims” (Sivakumaran 2007). For example, one case documented that:
“Daily Serb torturers forced Muslim prisoners to [explicative] each other, to
perform oral sex on each other, forcing these bestialities especially among family
members, between a father and son” (also see Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, Oral Proceedings of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, CR 2006/06, 51, available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/91/10596.pdf)
Also, in the Cesić Trial, Cesić also admitted intentionally forcing at gunpoint two
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detained Muslim brothers to perform fellatio on each other in the presence of other
people (Prosecutor v. Cesić, Sentencing Judgment). In a similar manner, the Blagoje
Simić trial judgment notes that, “…several Prosecution witnesses gave evidence that
detainees were subjected to sexual assaults. [Some] incidents involved forcing male
prisoners to perform oral sex on each other and on Stevan Todorovic, sometimes in
front of other prisoners” (see Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Miroslav Tadić and Siom
Zarić, Trial Judgment). Likewise, the Todorovic sentencing judgment itself notes that
Todorovic accepted that he “ordered Witness C and Witness D to perform oral sex on
each other and ordered Witness E and Witness F to do the same, laughing while it
went on” (see Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorovic, Sentencing Judgment).
Those forms of sexual violence against males demonstrate a feature that does
not share with sexual violence in peacetime, namely, the power that is conveyed
through indirect interactions between perpetrators and victims, rather than direct
physical contact between the perpetrator and the victim. There are other forms of
sexual violence that share such a feature, such as forced masturbation.
As Sivakumaran points out, there has not even been an appropriate name for
this form of abuse, which he terms “enforced rape” (Sivakumaran 2007).
Nonetheless, as demonstrated by the representative cases mentioned, all these
“enforced” forms of sexual violence against males serve as symbolic rituals to exert
the dominance of the normative masculinity of the state to which the perpetrators
belong through damaging the enemy state’s virility and phallic pride as well as
depriving the reproductive power of the enemy’s state. The hegemonic normative
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masculinity effeminizes others through dominating – taking over control of the
enemy’s virile capacity and reproductive of and subjugating that authority under its
own. While direct torture and damage by the perpetrators to the victims’ genitals
symbolizes the masculine dominance over the enemy state, such “enforced” forms of
sexual violence serves the same purpose. Being able to force the male victims of the
enemy state to conduct sexual behaviors against their will symbolizes the loss of
ownership and control of their sexual organ, thus their virile and reproductive
capacity, just like direct damage of their sexual genital and castration.
Why Would States Ever Securitize Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict?
There is a paradox on the fact, as sexual violence is instrumental in the
projection of masculine state power, then why would state ever agree to recognize it
as a crime? Furthermore, so far, why were only female victims that have been
recognized by the international legal regime as victims of sexual violence in armed
conflict, while their male counterparts were recognized only as the victim of torture in
general?
To resolve this paradox, this essay will argue that it is not inconsistent, but
actually fits the logic of the state’ acts for its own hegemonic, normative masculine
power. This essay will explain this motive of state by tracing the process of how the
sexual violence against females was securitized. This process demonstrated how
recognition and prosecution of sexual violence against females was permitted and
initiated by males to demonize the enemy’s soldiers, thus demonstrating the lack of
self-discipline – the “gentlemen” aspect of masculinity – compared to the greater
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masculine integrity of the prosecuting states.
In contrast, the states lack motivation to push the agenda of recognizing sexual
violence against males in armed conflict because the political cost outweighs political
gain. Therefore, the male victims have only been recognized under the category of
torture by international world.
Building on the theories of both Buzan et al., Hirschauer points out in The
Securitization of Rape: Women, War and Sexual Violence that securitization is “a
framing and shifting of an issue or a concern from normal or ordinary politics into the
realm of security” (Hirschauer 2014). This process takes place “once an issue or
concern [has been] transformed from a nonpolitical or a political status into an
existential threat. Once a credible entity (such as political leadership, institutions, or
non-governmental organizations) [is] identified an issue or sector as a threat, the
normative assumptions that have surrounded the original issue [are] redefined and
relocated” (Hirschauer 2014). For example, Hirschauer argues that, since the Bosnia
and Rwanda genocides, wartime rape has been recognized as war crime and crime
against humanity by international legal institutions, such as the International Criminal
Court (ICC) and international criminal tribunals. This recognition demonstrates that
the international world has recognized mass rape in armed conflict as “a threat to
national and international peace and security” (Hirschauer 2014).
Hirschauer further claims that those non-state actors have set legal precedents
for international legal system with implication that “wartime rape [is] systematically
implemented for specific political goals”. The recognition of sexual violence as an
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existential threat security has generated “a deepening interaction of and interplay
between a multitude of global actors such as the United Nations, non-governmental
organizations and an increasingly globalized media forced a normative repositioning”. This interaction between mostly non-state actors, based on Hirschauer,
contributed to the securitization of wartime rape (Hirschauer 2014).
Her argument, however, cannot explain why those non-state actors choose to
only securitize sexual violence against females. Instead, this essay argues
demonstrates the reality that it is the states that initiated and permitted the
securitization of sexual violence against females; and such securitization is principally
used by powerful states to discipline other weaker states as a tool to impose and
demonstrate their own dominant masculinity. The securitization of rape is mere
instrument for states is evidenced by: 1. Their extreme reluctance to use such
securitization against their own soldiers and staff; and 2. The gendered character of
securitization (ie. emphasizing female victims and de-emphasising male victims)
based on states’ cost-benefit analysis. The state, as a powerful ideational entity, not
only transfers its masculine principle to domestic institutions like administrative and
military agencies, but also to the international organizations like ICC or other legal
institutions that are incorporated into the process of asserting, reinforcing, and
reproducing the normative masculinity of competing states.
In Politicization of Sexual Violence: From Abolitionism to Peacekeeping,
Carol Harrington traces the actual institutional handling of traumatic experiences
suffered by women before the WWI and during the inter-war period. Based on her
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account, it was true that there was no official organization and agency that specifically
dealt with sexual violence against women. However, there were other organizations
and committees that were established and used by the Ally states, particularly through
the militaries, to demonize the German soldiers as sexually deviant predators while
depicting their own soldiers as pure and stoic, and mostly, desired. Besides such
official propaganda on eulogizing “our” solders, the military and government also
attributed the “occasional” unwanted sexual relationship between soldiers and
civilians to the promiscuity (and immaturity) of (young) women. Logically, the
military and government established or at least allowed and encouraged the
establishment of women police that ironically focused less on guarding off the male
aggressiveness but rather to discipline those unruly women from contaminating the
pure and good boys of their own military (Harrington 2010).
This account demonstrates how the recognition and prosecution of sexual
violence against female in conflict was initiated and permitted by males. More
importantly, this process illustrated how such securitization was driven by politics
rather than normative shifts. More importantly, the collective endorsement of
securitization of wartime sexual violence against females shows how the process of
securitization is performative between the states that propose the recognition and
prosecution of war time sexual violence, the institutions and other states that agree to
such recognition and prosecution. This process relies very heavily across various
stages on endorsement and action from other actors. Essentially, “securitization is a
deeply intersubjective process, meaning it is predicated upon an intense interplay
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between subjects”. This inter-subjectivity dictates not only an operational adherence
to specific steps and process sequences (Buzan et al. 1998), but a legitimation of a
specific threat between subjects” (Hirschauer 2014). In the end, securitization then
becomes not only intersubjective because it demands interactive validation, but it also
remains consistently a perennial ‘leap of faith’ – a subjective, inter-subjective political
act – a political choice (Hirschauer 2014) by strong states that could afford such
option. Therefore, the political need and motives to securitize wartime sexual violence
against females precede the construction of new norms, which then legitimize the
adoption of exceptional measures by those dominant states to prosecute sexual
violence against female victims through international legal institutions,
What’s more, as Suzanne Berger asserts, “…the timing and characteristics of
state intervention affect not only organizational tactics and strategies, but the content
and definition of interest itself” (Berger 1981). Accordingly, tracing the process of
state’s securitization of rape as a weapon of war reveals the purposive logic behind
such act that prosecuting sexual violence is no more than an expedient choice for the
state to preserve and enhance its masculine image.
What’s more, those government and military institutions tried to focus and
highlight women trafficking specifically because this issue, or their framing of this
issue, justified their regulation of women, rather than men. After WWI, during the
interwar session, the affiliation of those women organizations to the state government
remained. The League of Nations wanted to recognize those women groups as experts
for issues like sex trafficking on which they wanted to focus. But these women groups
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started to realize the potential danger of relying on the permitting of male dominated
agencies to promote certain agenda that would lead to their being no more than tools
of those patriarchal agencies purported by the state. Gradually the women group focus
more on the scientific research on sexual violence against women, rather than the
politicization of these cases. The power dynamics between male dominated agencies
and female organizations that tried and failed to promote the prevention of sexual
violence in armed conflict clearly demonstrates how the initial securitization was
permitted and sanctioned by the patriarchal states for their own purpose. The
recognition and prosecution of sexual violence is no more than a useful tool for
dominant state to continue to enhance the role of a disciplined ‘us’ versus
pathologized and perverted others, thus reinforcing the normative masculine authority.
Even more revealing is the selective prosecution of sexual violence due to the
state’s gendered bias. As mentioned above, there has been no single case sentencing
perpetrators of sexual violence against male victims with charges of sexual violence.
This biased selection reflects the political calculation of states in securitizing sexual
violence. Namely, while securitizing the sexual violence against females could be
useful to self-promote the image of disciplined gentlemen of the dominant state
against the weak or defeated state, prosecuting sexual violence against male victims
bears a cost that is, at least in current times, too high for all the parties in armed
conflict to bear. For the state to which male victim of sexual violence belong,
recognizing that its own male agents are being sexually violated by another state’s
agents equals admitting its own shameful and possibly permanent loss of masculinity.
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For the state to which perpetrators belong, encouraging or even just accepting the
prosecution of its own male agents as perpetrators of sexual violence against other
males means this state allows other states to also pathologize those individual
perpetrators and therefore the state itself. In this way, sexual violence is no longer an
instrument to enhance the masculinity of perpetrators’ state but a weapon for other
states to smear its heteronormative masculine image, thus nullifying the whole point
of facilitating sexual violence for state in the first place. For third party states, it is
simply more practical to remain reticence in legally recognizing sexual violence
against males in armed conflict because of the uncertainty of their own agents
becoming either perpetrators or victims of such heinous crimes in the future. In a
word, whether to prosecute or to acquiesce on the issue of sexual violence against
males in armed conflict depends totally on the political gains ultimately for the state’s
masculinity.
Conclusion:
This essay recognizes the role of the state as the embodiment of the
masculinity in contributing to the occurrence of sexual violence against males in
armed conflict. It explains why perpetrators, despite their heterosexuality, or even
homophobia, would commit sexual violence against males. By elevating the main
actor from individual to the state, this essay provides a new perspective in explaining
why states have been silent in addressing the sexual violence issues against males in
armed conflict, even for those states in which the victims reside.
More importantly, by disclosing the state’s hegemonic heteronormative bias,
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this essay sounds a warning bell for the dire consequence of adhering to individualcentric explanations. While such individual centric argument is insufficient to uncover
the reason for states neglecting male victims in sexual violence, such heteronormative
bias of state has resulted in the ignoring of male victims of sexual violence in armed
conflict, which could lead to lack of proper reconciliation as well as reigniting of
conflict.
Despite the victim’s gender and sexuality, systematic sexual atrocities are a
blatant violation of universal human rights that trample on basic humanitarian
principles. However, even though sexual violence against male victims has been
rampaging in armed conflict since ancient time, the institutionalized heteronormative
bias has fostered a reticence on both national and international level for recognizing
the needs of male victims of sexual violence in armed conflict. Even today, attention
and resource allocation has neglected male victims of sexual violence in armed
conflict to a large extent. The international tribunals have recognized the systematic
sexual violence against women in armed conflict as a war crime and crime against
humanity; however, violent cases against male victims—if they are ever reported—
have been lumped together and prosecuted under the general category of torture. The
medical facilities made available to victims also largely favor female victims, while
male victims are either unknowingly screened out, or deliberately shrugged off (Davis
2000; Norredam et al. 2005). Thus male sexual assault victims face multiple levels of
victimization by their attacker(s) as well as rejection, and stigmatization by family,
friends, and society in general (Davis 2000).
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Consequently, those victims’ needs for legal redress and therapeutic
reconciliation are compromised, to say the least. This compromise also reinforces the
severe social stigma against insufficient attention and lack of resources towards male
victims of sexual violence in armed conflict. In turn, the result would be that even
fewer male victims speak up, leading to more severe under-documentation and
insufficient resources for their neglected and silenced need. Even more egregious in
this scenario is the fact that such neglect of male victims and their needs has produced
de facto impunity of their perpetrators, resulting in encouraging further sexual
violence against male victims in armed conflict. This vicious circle of perpetuating
sexual abuse on males in conflict with impunity significantly jeopardizes the
effectiveness of post-conflict reconstruction, risking easy re-igniting of the conflict
due to personal revenge or other latent psychological trauma. Under the context of
public negligence and legal impunity, it is more likely to encourage and spawn the
normalization of sexual violence on males in wartime. As the majority of fighting
power, the future soldiers then would be less hesitant to conduct sexual violence on
male targets, even after the conflict, as a non-official and punishment free retaliation,
thus hampering the post-conflict reconciliation and enhancing the possibility of reignition of conflict. More importantly, such neglecting of male victimhood could push
those victimized males to future victimize females, following the norm and projecting
their power upon those perceived even inferior than them. Therefore, to
fundamentally deal with the sexual violence against victims of both genders requires
the recognition and proper resolution correspondingly that could eradicate the deeply
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embedded heteronormative bias sprung from the state’s prioritization of its
masculinity.
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